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CASE COMMENTS

NEGLIGENCE V WARRANTY: THE FORMS OF ACTION LIVE
In the past decade the trend in products liability cases pursued in
tort has been toward the abandonment of the privity of contract requirement.' In cases pursued in warranty, however, a majority of states
still require privity. 2 A plaintiff's choice of remedy, therefore, may de'Breach of warranty originally sounded in tort as an action on the case and was
connected with deceit. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147
N.E.2d 612, 614 (195o); Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015, 1017-18
(1955); 1 Williston, Sales §§ 195-97 (rev. ed. 1948); Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888). It was not until Stuart v. Wilkins, i Dougl. 18, 99 Eng.
Rep. 15 (1778), that a contract action was even recognized. The historic case of
Winterbottom v. Wright, lo M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), led to a separation of the tort and contract approaches to products liability. Although Winterbottom held only that an action on the case would -notlie on a contract, it was generally misread to stand for the proposition that privity of contract was necessary to
recover for injuries due to defective chattels in an action ex contractu. Prosser,
Torts § 96 at 658-59 (3d ed. 1964). Thomas -v. Winchester, 2 Seld 397 (N.Y. 1852).
rejected privity in tort cases by holding that privity was no bar to an action in
tort where "negligence" was involved; but this trend culminated in the historic
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1o5o (1916), which
held that a manufacturer not in privity with the plaintiff was under a liabilityimposing duty to inspect for defective components in assembling a product to be
used by the purchaser withouit further inspection.
2
The prevailing view in states which have not passed the U.C.C. is that privity
ii indispensable to a successful warranty action by an injured person against a defendant manufacturer or seller. Alabama, Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Clark, 2o5 Ala 678, 89 So. 64 (1921); Arizona, Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Delaware, Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961); Kansas, Alexander v. Inland Steel
CO., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958), but see B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d
501 (ioth Cir. 1959) (Lack of privity bars recovery for breach of express warranty
but not for breach of implied warranty); Minnesota, Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Mississippi, Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co., 31o F.2d
291 (5 th Cir. 1962); Nevada, Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d
399 (1963); North Carolina, Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 259
N.C. 400, 131 S.E.2d 9 (1963); South Carolina, Odom v. Ford Motor CO., 230 S.C.
320, 95 S.E.2d 6oi (1956); South Dakota, Whitethorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465,
293 N.W. 859 (1940); Texas, Luse v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 625 ( 5 th Cir.
1961); Washington, Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat, Inc., 6o Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d
549 (1962).
However, an expanding number of jurisdictions recognize an exception to the
privity requirement in cases involving impure food products and inherently dangerous products. Alabama, Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, supra; California, Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); Maine, Pelletier v. DuPont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Ad. 186 (1925); Maryland, Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 152 A.2d 196 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959):
North Carolina, Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 223, 87 S.E. 958
(1916); Ohio, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 274, 161 N.E. 557 (1928);
South Dakota, Whitethorn v. Nash-Finch Co., supra; Virginia, Colonna v. Rosedale
Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936); West Virginia, Burgess v. Sanitary Meat
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termine the result in a products liability situation. 3
In Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons4 the plaintiff's only remedy
was an action for breach of warranty. 5 The plaintiff's chickens were
Mkt., 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785, 6 S.E.2d 254 (1939);
4sconsin, Smith v. Atco
Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 709 (1959)Exceptions involving food containers are found in: California, Vassallo v.
Sabatte Land Co., supra, Florida, Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 196o); Michigan, Dobrenski v. Blatz Brewing Co., 41 F. Supp 291
(W.D. Mich. 1941). Contra, Missouri,McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949); Oklahoma, Soter v. Griesedieck W. Brewer Co., 200
Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948).
Exceptions involving animal food, as in the principal case, are found in: California, McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Montana, Seaton
Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable Oil & Feed Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d 5,19 (195o).
3
Confusion between tort and contract approaches to the privity requirement
has hindered any uniform application which might give the plaintiff a clear understanding of what he must state to prove his case. Following are some of the problems
encountered; Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705, 708-09 (D. Colo. 1954)
(proof of a breach of a duty of care); Parish v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc.
2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 21 (Munic. Ct. 1958) (contributory negligence); Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 85-86 (D. Hawaii 1961) (contributory negligence and as.
sumption of risk); Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App. 2d 442, 139 P.2d 86 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1943) (survival of actions); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (1oth
Cir. 1959) (wrongful death); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 18o F. Supp. 31
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (wrongful death); Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4
N.E.2d 465 (1936) (wrongful death); Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12
N.E.2d 557 (1938) (wrongful death); Jones v. Goggs & Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 135, 49
A.2d 379 (1946) (statute of limitations); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App.
2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (statute of limitations); Amran & Goodman, Some Problems in the Law of Implied Warranty, 3 Syracuse L. Rev. 259, 268
(1952) (measure of damages).
Further confusion has come from the variety of fictions courts have used to
circumvent the privity barrier in contract actions. Mr. Cornelius W. Gilliam has
uncovered twenty-nine different rationalizations by courts; Gilliam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153 (1958), of which fictitious agency,
Bowman v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1954),
and third party beneficiary contracts, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App.
475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928), Parish v. Great At. &. Pac. Tea Co., supra at 12-14, 26,
have been the most prevalent. In the last decade the concept of an implied warranty of merchantability running with the goods, as found in the principal case,
has supplanted previous theories, Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185
A.2d 919, 921 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962).
42o9 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965).
'Plaintiff's counsel pointed out the difficulties of a system in which the action
could be brought in tort or contract when he stated to the writer in correspondence
dated Sept. 3o, 1965: "We would have preferred to pursue the Plaintiff's claim in tort,
but unfortunately the defendant was not then susceptible to service in the state of
Rhode Island, except by an action in rem, in that we were aware of certain funds
due and owing to the defendant by one of its Rhode Island dealers. Since Rhode
Island permits attachments in contract but not in tort we brought the action in
assumpsit for breach of warranty, attaching the funds of the defendant in the hands
and possession of its Rhode Island dealer, hoping that our Supreme Court would
finally abolish the privity requirement."
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harmed by the use of a feed manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff
alleged that the feeds in question were manufactured and packaged
in sealed bags for sale to the public6 and that the defendant therefore
impliedly warranted that the feeds were of merchantable quality, reasonably safe, and suitable for their intended purpose when properly
used.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island declined the opportunity to
abolish the privity requirement in ex contractu actions. The court,
noting that contract and tort actions were treated separately in Rhode
Island, felt that it could not resort to judicial legislation to undo
the decisional law requiring privity in a contract action and that it
could not allow a tort recovery when the action had been pursued in
assumpsit. The acquiescence of the legislature to prior criticism of
this policy was taken by the court as implied approval of the previous
decisions on this point.
Although the court in the principal case held that the adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code did not change the existing law
concerning privity with the manufacturer or imply that such change
was thereby delegated to the courts, 7 a more thorough examination
'Although we do not know for certain that advertising played a part in the
plaintiff's purchasing of the chicken feed, it is interesting to note that this was not
considered in the case. Courts have drawn an exception to the general rule requiring privity in warranty cases where it appeared that the injured party, although not in privity with the manufacturer, acted in reliance on the manufacturer's statements in his labels and advertising. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.
2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Worley v. Procter 9- Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App.
1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Lardaro v. MBS Cigar Corp., so Misc. 2d 873, 177
N.Y.S.2d 6(Munic. Ct. 1957); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d
813 (1940); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958).
The immediate issue in the principal case was one of proper pleading, and
the court intimates that if the action had been brought in trespass on the case the
result would have been in plaintiff's favor. Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons,
2o9 A.ad 46 (R.I. 1965). Although this might seem to be little more than a lesson in
procedure for one who could not readily bring his action in tort, this might qualify
as an "emergency or extreme condition" which the court had said would warrant
resort to judicial legislation. Id. at 48.
It might be enlightening to consider the holding on this same question of
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.ad 691, 694 (1951), where the court found
that their "court said, long ago, that it had not only the right, but the duty to
re-examine a question where justice demands it.... [I]t is the duty of the court
to bring the law into accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice
rather than 'with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past."'
'The Rhode Island court, while recognizing the modern approach to products
liability, cited Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 RJ. 51, 112 A.ad 701
(1955), and Wolf v. S.H. Wintman Co., 87 R.I. 156, 139 A.2d 84 (1958), as Rhode
Island precedents which controlled the law on the requirement of privity in as-
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of the code's effect upon privity is necessary. At present the U.C.C. has
been adopted in 44 jurisdictions.8
§ 2-318

Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied
sumpsit and expressed its reluctance to overrule these decisions since no emergency
warranting change existed. Supra note 4, at 47.
The court stated in the principal case that, "such long acquiescence in decision law by the legislature, especially after its attention has been called to repeated litigous criticism of its underlying policy, is persuasive proof of at least
implied legislative approval of the decisions." Supra note 4, at 48. That argument
is questionable in view of the fact that it was the courts who fabricated the rule
requiring privity in contract actions, Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), and the apparent fact
that legislatures could easily remain ignorant of a problem or not consider it without any idea of impliedly approving of privity. The concurring opinion of Justice
Joslin in the principal case takes this into account when he states, "While a deferral
to the legislature in the initiation of changes in matters affecting public policy
may often be appropriate, it is not required where the concept demanding change
is judicial in its origins. The requirement of privity in suits against the manufacturer is such a concept. It is of judicial making and was first enunciated in
Winterbottom v. Wright." Supra note 5, at 51.
8
Carroll & Whiteside, Forms for Commercial Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, Preface to 1966 repl. part (1965).

1966]

CASE COMMENTS

A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
§ 2-318:1. Official Code Comment.
3.... This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser.
Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who re-sells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
Within the distributive chain from the manufacturer through the
wholesaler to the retailer to the ultimate purchaser and his possible
family, household, and guests there are actually two separate privity
problems. The first is whether a member of the family or household or
a guest of the purchaser who actually bought the goods from the retailer could sue the retailer irrespective of lack of privity. This has
been explicitly answered yes by § 2-318 of the U.C.C. However, the
question of whether the purchaser, a member of his family or his
household or a guest could sue the manufacturer directly despite lack
of privity between the parties, the question in the principal case, is
left by the U.C.C. to the "developing case law."
The "neutrality" and "developing case law" language in the comments to § 2-318 reflect the careful attitude that was necessarily
adopted by the framers of the U.C.C. in order that this apparently
controversial issue might not hinder the acceptance of the Code or
cause change or deletion of § 2-318. In the interpretation of comment
3 the courts have had to decide whether the courts or the legislatures
were to have control over this area, and, contrary to the principal
case, this language has been held to expressly leave the question of
privity to the judiciary1o It should be pointed out that the accepted
trend in products liability is toward abolition of privity." Thus, the
""*Appellee contends that the Uniform Sales Act codified the doctrine of privity
and that any change must come from legislation. This argument has been rejected

often by the courts. Moreover, the Uniform Commercial Code, the most comprehensive proposed legislation on the subject, expressly leaves questions concerning
privity to the judiciary." Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note
3, at 922-23.
"The reasoning behind the liberalizing trend, which today strives toward the

abolition of privity of contract in both implied and express warranties, is one of
social policy. Jacob E. Decker g- Sons, Inc v. Capps, 139 Tex. 6og, 164 S.V.2d 828,
829 (1942). Manufacturing has advanced past the stage of the i8th century artisan
and customer in an over-the-counter relationship and has grown to nationwide
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language leaving the settlement of this question to the "developing
case law" might be interpreted to intimate that the framers of the
U.C.C. were not in favor of the privity doctrine but would wish to
see its gradual judicial demise by reference to an existing liberal
judicial trend.
Although no clear cut classification can be drawn, it may be said
that of the 44 jurisdictions which have passed the U.C.C. at least 9,
have abandoned the requirement of privity for actions upon an implied warranty running from the manufacturer, and the U.C.C.
played no apparent part in any actual decisional abandonment of
12
privity.
production and distribution of goods. The privity doctrine was conceived when the
producer and the buyer dealt with each other personally and the products were
relatively less complicated and conducive to adequate inspection and evaluation by
the immediate purchaser. With the advent of mass production of more sophisticated
goods, the manufacturer became remote from the purchaser, and intermediaries
handled the goods and cultivated the public into potential consumers. At the same
time the product often became so complicated or highly refined that the average
person could not be expected to pass judgment on its fitness for the purpose for
which it was intended. Thus, a majority of the legal writers, Hursh, American Law
of Products Liability § 6.16 at 534 (1961); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel,
69 Yale L.J. o99 (1960); Jaeger, Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty,
39 Notre Dame Lawyer 5o (1964), and a growing minority of the jurisdiction,
E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 23 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 8o-8i (196o),
have felt that the law should have changed with the mode of industry and have
sought methods for holding the manufacturer liable for the harm done by his defective products.
"California, § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code is entirely omitted from
the California version of the Code, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (strict tort liability upon the manufacturer for defective product imposed without reliance on warranty); Connecticut,
Simpson v. Powered Prods. of Mich., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 0963)
(U.C.C. considered as broadening the old rule but not a necessary factor in the
abolition of privity); District of Columbia, Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962) (U.C.C. does not codify privity
question and thus not significant); Michigan, Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 363 Mich. 235, 1o9 N.W.2d 918 (ig6i) (U.C.C. not taken into account); Spence
v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonary Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.-d 873
(1958) (U.C.C. does not effect decision); New Jersey, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (196o) (U.C.C. not considered), Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960); New York, Williams
v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962) (U.C.C. not
considered); Oregon, Spada v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 8Sg (D. Ore. 1961)
(applying Oregon law, noting lack of applicable Oregon state court decisions);
Pennsylvania,McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 19o F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 196o )
(applying Pennsylvania law), but see Hochgerfel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 61o,
187 A.2d 575 (1963) (necessity of privity has been abolished only in cases of goods
for human consumption which cause injury to a subpurchaser; third parties must
sue in tort); Tennessee, Ford Motor Co., v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d

840, 852 (1946) (implied that privity not necessary in a negligence action), Coca-
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The law of the ig or 20 U.C.C. states which require privity of
contract in implied warranty represents every qualification of the
privity question. A rudimentary accounting of the ways in which these
jurisdictions have limited the abolition of privity in both negligence
and breach of warranty will show the approaches that the different
courts have taken toward the privity doctrine.13 Some have done away
with privity when an impure food product 14 or an inherently dangerCola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942) (no privity
required in cases of injury from unwholesome food and drugs).
Virginia abolished the defense of lack of privity in breach of warranty and
negligence actions by Acts 1962, ch. 476, which became § 8-654.3 of Va. Code Ann.
Since this section goes further than U.C.C. § 2-318, which remains neutral regarding
extension of right to sue manufacturers directly, the assumption is that it will
remain in effect after Jan. 1, 1966, when the U.C.C. goes into effect in Virginia.
But see note to Va. Code Ann. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1965).
FIlaska, no cases available; Arkansas, Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 94
F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Ark 1950) (general requirement of privity in warranty cases);
Georgia, Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 1o2 Ga. App. 842, 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961) (where
the implied warranty to be relied upon by the statutory "ultimate consumer," was
held to mean only purchaser and not a non-purchasing consumer or user) (but
note effect of U.C.C. upon family, household, guests, etc.); Indiana, Gahimer
v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 241 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1957) (privity necessary if
manufacturer did not have a duty to warn the purchaser); Kentucky, Schultz v.
Tesumseh Prods., 31o F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962) (citing Kentucky law to the effect
that privity is essential in a breach of implied warranty), C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C.
Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956) (privity not required in negligence); Maryland,
Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 152 A.2d 196 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959) (where
privity required an implied warranty), Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d
375 (1958) (privity not required in negligence); Massachusetts, Sullivan v. H. P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 8o (1960) (privity an absolute defense
in warranty), Carter v. Yardley & CO., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946) (privity
requirement in negligence actions abandoned); Missouri, Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.,
328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (lack of privity in implied warranty no bar to the action);
Montana, Larson v. United States Rubber Co., 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958)
(court found no Montana law upon the requirement for privity in negligence but
held there would be no requirement); New Hampshire, Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1945) (privity required in breach of implied
warranty); Ohio, Kennedy v. General Beauty Prods., Inc., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 135, 167
N. E. 116 (Ct. App. 196o) (privity required in implied warranty); Rhode Island,
Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955) (privity
necessary in implied warranty); West Virginia, Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt.,
121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785, 6 S.E.2d 254 (1939) (court held privity essential in
breach of warranty); Wisconsin, Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis., 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697
(1959) (privity not necessary in negligence); Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261
Wis. 584, 53 N.V.2d 788 (1952) (privity required in implied warranty); Wyoming
substituted "any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods" for the U.C.C. § 2-318 text describing those persons protected by a seller's warranty. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34:2-318 (1957).
"Arkansas, Drury v. Armour & Co., 14o Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919) (exception
to the requirement of privity in negligence allowed where impure food was involved); Illinois, Albin v. Illinois Corp Improvement Ass'n, 30 111. App. 2d 283, 174
N.E.2d 697 (1961) (recognizing the exception to the privity rule applied for food pro-
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ous product 5 is involved. This demonstrates how the failure of the
U.C.C. to take a firm stand on this apparently controversial issue has
left unresolved the mass of conflicts which existed prior to the adoption of the U.C.C. between the jurisdictions and even within a single

jurisdiction.
Tort concepts as a rule have advanced toward the complete abolition of privity at a much faster rate.16 The differences between tort
and contract approaches to the problem, however, could be eliminated
by the combination of these two types of claims into a distinct remedy for products liability as a whole.17 In many cases liability is not
predicated upon either negligence or breach of implied warranty
of fitness but upon the broad policy principle of protecting human
ducts in both warranty and negligence); Montana, Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana
Vegetable Oil & Food Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d 549 (1950) (food product exception
to the privity requirement upheld); Nebraska, Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172
Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961) (privity in implied warranty involving a food
product not required); Oklahoma, Cook v. Safeway Store, Inc., 330 P.2d 375 (Okla.
1958) (privity not necessary in action in implied warranty involving a food product); Rhode Island, Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 5o R.I. 43, 144 Ad.
884 (1929) (privity was necessary in negligence action involving unwholesome food
or beverage).
nlllinois,-Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n, 30 Ill. Ap. 2d 283, 174
N.E.2d 697 (1961) (recognizing the exception to the privity requirement applied to
inherently dangerous products in warranty and negligence action); Indiana,
Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 241 F.2d 836 (7 th Cir. 1957) (privity
necessary if not an inherently dangerous product); Maine, Pelletier v. DuPont, 124
Me. 269, 128 At. 186 (1925) (privity not required as to contract or negligence actions
involving inherently or imminently dangerous products); Missouri, Stevens v.
Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964) (exception to the privity rule in
negligence action involving imminently or inherently dangerous products);
Nebraska, Colvin v. John Powell & Co., 163 Neb. 112, 77 NAW.2d goo (1956) (privity
not necessary in negligence action involving imminently or inherently dangerous
products); New Hampshire, Lenz v. Standard Oil Co., 88 NH. 212, 186 At. 329
(1936) (inherently or imminently dangerous product exception to the privity rule
recognized in negligence action); New Mexico, Wood v. Sloan, 2o N.M. 127, 148
Pac. 507 (10915) (exception to rule requiring privity in negligence actions was recognized as to inherently or imminently dangerous products); Ohio, Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 94 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 197 N.E.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1964) (no privity
required in breach of express warranty in advertising or as to inherently dangerous
products); Oklahoma, Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 6o3, 35 P.2d 916 (1934) (where
the imminently or inherently dangerous product exception to the privity rule in
negligence case was upheld); Rhode Island, Collette v. Page, 44 R.I. 26, 114 At.
136 (1921)

(privity not required in

negligence action involving an imminently

dangerous product); West Virginia, Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 8o S.E.2d
857 (1954) (privity required in negligence action no involving imminently or inherently dangerous product).
'ORestatement (Second), Torts § 4 02A comment a (1965). Jaeger, Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 Notre Dame Law. 501 (1964).
"Jaeger, Id. at 5o4.

